The behaviour of limit order quotes and trading activity are studied using a unique and rich database that includes the identity of market participants from a fully automated derivatives market. The analysis is performed using transactions records for three aggregated trader types and three trade identifiers, with trades stamped in milliseconds for the SXF, the equity futures contract of the Montreal Exchange. The identifiers distinguish trades between principals; agency based trades, as well as transactions that are conducted for risk management as opposed to speculative purposes. Agency related trades are shown to represent the largest amount of trading activity relative to other account types. Over 90% of trades in this electronic market are limit orders. The limit order book, especially the depth 1 order, has a dominant role in providing liquidity and in explaining market participants' trading behaviour. Participants in the SXF reference their trades to the best limit order depth. Hence, investors with large positions or investors who want to build a large position have to strategically split large orders to close/build their position, according to the depth of the best limit order, to ameliorate price impact and information leakage effects. In addition, the results show that traditionally measured spreads have no relationship with trading costs.
INTRODUCTION
Many exchanges in the world have shifted to the computerized trading systems for equities or derivatives. This shift has in part been driven by the belief that the computerized trading offers lower transaction costs than traditional floor-based trading systems. One of the distinguishing features of a computerized trading market vs. a floor trading market is its transparent limit order book. Whether or not the increase in transparency of the computerized market comes at the expense of higher transactions costs and diminished liquidity has been a matter of considerable debate in the literature. The purpose of this study is to provide new evidence on this score using quotations and trades from an electronic market that operates via a limit order book. Our database is particularly rich in that it captures differences in transactions costs and trading activity between principals (vs. agents) as well as transactions that are conducted for risk management as opposed to speculative purposes. A number of theoretical models have been proposed on how the limit order book affects liquidity and conveys information about the market. Such information might be expected to affect the trading conduct of market participants (e.g. Glosten, 1994; Handa and Schwartz, 1996; Foucault, 1999; Handa et al., 2003 and Van Achter, 2009 ). Foucault et al. (2005) propose an equilibrium model for order placement and argue that the proportion of patient traders in the population and the order arrival rate are the key determinants of the limit order book dynamics. In addition, a number of empirical studies have examined the order submissions process as market conditions change (e.g. Biais et al., 1995; Griffiths et al., 2000; Ahn et al., 2001 and Hollifield et al., 2003) . Chan (2005) find orders at the best quotes react more quickly and completely to the adjustment than orders that are far away from the best quotes using the limit-order book and previous price movements for active stocks traded on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong. Moreover, several other studies have appeared that examine the role of the limit-order books in supplementing liquidity. For example, Degryse et al. (2005) analyze the resiliency of a pure limit order market and find that relative to the sample average, depths stay around their mean before and after aggressive orders, whereas spreads return to their mean after about twenty best limit updates. The initial price impact of the aggressive order is partly reversed in the subsequent transactions. Coppejans et al. (2003) study the resiliency of the Swedish stock index futures market (OMX) and find that shocks to depth are restored in less than 60 minutes.
On the whole, the role of information contained in the limit order book in influencing participants' trading behaviour remains an unsettled matter in the literature. Madhavan et al. (2005) document a reduction in liquidity on the TSE following the increase in order book disclosure. They report an increase in quoted and effective spreads, reduction in depth at the best quotes and an increase in volatility. Bortoli et al. (2006) show that after the increase in pre-trade transparency limit of its limit order book, the SFE experienced a reduction in depth (mean and median), and some widening of bid-ask spreads. These studies suggest that in a transparent market, limit order traders charge market order traders a higher premium for execution certainty by withdrawing depth from the best quotes, or by increasing bid-ask spreads. In sharp contrast, Boehmer et al. (2005) document a reduction in effective spreads on the NYSE following the introduction of the Open Book, consistent with an increase in market liquidity.
Our analysis is performed for one of the most important futures products on the Montreal Exchange, the S&P/TSX 60 index futures (SXF) contract. Since 2001, the Montreal Exchange has operated as a fully automated derivatives market and currently serves as the exclusive market for financial derivative products in Canada. The transaction records are timed by milliseconds and reflect actual trading activity that spans the period January 2005 to May 2006. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first attempt to use actual trading records for a comprehensive set of trader categories to study the limit order book in financial futures products.
We find that that most transactions (well over 90%) in this electronic market are from limit orders. In addition, measures of trading activities and traditionally measured spreads have no relationship with trading costs. Limit orders in the electronic system of the Montreal Exchange serve to replace traditional market markers to provide market liquidity. The order information shown on the screen systematically influences the trading behaviour of participants in the markets. Participants in the markets respect the limit order book, especially the quotes of first priority order (best 1), to make their trading decisions. We find that SXF market in consistent with a dynamic equilibrium process: and the size of best 1 quote is much more than the size of transaction per trade in. In particular, the liquidity/buffer provided the best 1 quote is responsible for that measure of trading activities that have no demonstrative relationship with trading costs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in the Section 2, we describe the data set used in this work. The empirical analyses follow in Section 3. The paper concludes in Section 4.
DATA
The Montreal Exchange is the exclusive exchange for trading financial derivative products in Canada. In 2001, the exchange became the first traditional exchange in North America to be fully automated. Clients' orders are filled on a "first in, first out" (FIFO) basis. Market orders to buy futures contracts are executed at the offer price (ask); market orders to sell are executed at the bid price (bid). However, an investor wishing to buy or sell at a specific price can provide a limit order. This order is registered in SAM's (Montréal Automated System) electronic order book and is executed when there is a counterparty interested in transacting at that price. Orders are matched and both orders are filled at the specified price for the smallest quantity posted. Since all of the trading of any specific futures contract is concentrated on one trading platform, SAM, participants are assured of buying at the lowest offer price or selling to the highest bid.
The Exchange also provides a system of specialists and market-makers. The specialist is responsible for the opening of each product, and is required to be at his or her post no less than 30 minutes before the opening signal of a trading session. Market-makers are obligated to maintain 50% of their quarterly activities in their assigned product. Transactions of specialists and market-makers in any security on which they have assumed responsibilities are required to be of a stabilizing nature. They are prohibited from making trades that may be disruptive of stability, such as purchases (sales) made at a price above (below) the last preceding different -priced trade while establishing or increasing a position.
The S&P/TSE 60 index futures (SXF) contract is one of the most important futures products in the Montreal Exchange. The underlying product of the SXF is the S&P/TSE 60 index, an equity portfolio composed of 60 highly liquid Canadian equities. Standard & Poor's Corporation calculates and disseminates index prices. The SXF contract is quoted in index points, expressed to two decimals and the nominal value of one contract is C$200 times the index. The minimum price fluctuation of SXF is 0.05 index points. The value of 0.10 index point change is C$20 per contract. SXF contract months are March, June, September and December; and it is cash settlement and trades between 9:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m.
(EST).
The data that we use in this study are considerably richer than those used in most previous studies that we are aware. The sample covers the 356 trading day period from January 2005 to May 2006. Our data allow us to identify trades as Limit, Market or Market on Opening transactions. Our data set provides real time quotes for bid and ask positions at various prices. The best bid price is defined as the highest price a prospective buyer is prepared to pay at a particular time for trading the futures contract. In the analyses, the variable Best 1 Bid is defined as the best bid depth, which corresponds to the sum of all bid sizes (number of contracts) that are submitted as limit orders for trading at the best bid price for market participant bid quotations that are equal to the best bid price. Best 2 Bid is the second best bid depth, and so forth. The best ask (or offer) price is the lowest price at which someone who owns the contract offers to sell it. We define Best 1 Ask as the best ask depth, which is the sum of all ask sizes (number of contracts) that are submitted as limit orders to trade at the best ask price for market participant ask quotations that are equal to the best ask price. Best 2 Ask is the second best ask depth.
In addition we have two sets of identifiers for each transaction to distinguish between those that were buyer or seller initiated (buy or sell). First, each buy or sell is marked by four types of aggregated accounts: Client, Pro, Shareholder NonClient and Firm. Client accounts are defined as accounts established by an approved participant that is confined to Exchange transactions executed by and positions carried by the approved participant on behalf of his clients. Firm accounts are accounts established by an approved participant, that is confined to Exchange transactions executed by and positions carried by the approved participant on behalf of the approved participant. Pro accounts are accounts established by an approved participant, that is confined to Exchange transactions executed by and positions carried by the approved participant on behalf of a market maker. A Pro can be a market maker or a liquidity provider. In addition, the trading records also identify each buy or sell as representing transactions of Hedgers, or Speculators, or Market Makers. Since Shareholder NonClient only has very few transactions in the records, we use the trading records on the Client, Pro, Firm account categories and transactions by Hedger, Speculator and Market Maker groupings in our analysis.
Similar to Locke and Venkatesh (1997) , the nearby SXF contract is selected each day, and it is rolled forward to the subsequent contract on the date when the maximum daily trading volume (Client account) switches from the nearby contract to the subsequent contract.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSES

Transaction Costs and Trading Activity
Several studies have appeared that explore the relationship between trading activity and transaction costs, and typically find that there are economies to scale in trading. Most of these studies use bid-ask spreads as measures of transactions costs. For example, Demsetz (1968) and Epps (1976) find that trading activity is inversely related to trading costs on NYSE stocks. Martell and Wolf (1987) conclude that trading volume is not only a function of volatility, but also of open interest, interest rates, exchange rates, and other variables. Haller and Stoll (1989) reported an inverse relationship between bid-ask spreads and trading volume in the German auction equity market. In addition, George and Longstaff (1993) document a negative relationship between transaction rates and bid-ask spreads for the S&P 100 index options market. Wang et al. (1994) state that the major factors affecting bid-ask spreads are price risk, trade volume, and market competition. Wang et al. (1997) report a positive relationship between trading volume and intraday price volatility, and an inverse relationship between trading volume and bid-ask spreads, after controlling for other factors. Locke and Venkatesh (1997) show that bid-ask spreads are extremely problematic measures of transactions costs. For spreads to measure true transactions costs, it must be the case that customers trade exclusively with market makers. This assumption is clearly violated by many trading venues, particularly electronic platforms. In addition, as Stoll (1989) notes, even if all trades are mediated through market makers, the quoted bid-ask spread overstates actual transaction costs if some customers are better informed than the market makers or market makers adjust the bid -ask spread prices to manage inventory levels. Real world factors also imply that bid-ask spreads are not the best measure of the costs of trading, since intercustomer trades do take place in most financial markets that may eliminate transaction costs in aggregate.
To improve upon spreads as measures of transactions costs, a number of studies have used Computerized Trade Reconstruction (CTR) audit trail data from the CME and employ accounting FIFO (First in, First out) trading profits to estimate the transaction costs (e.g. Chang et al., 1994; Fishman and Longstaff, 1992; Manaster and Mann, 1996; Chang and Locke, 1996; Locke and Venkatesh, 1997; Ferguson and Mann, 2001; Sarajoyi, 2004 and Kurov, 2005) . Accounting FIFO trading profit estimates provide a direct measure of transactions costs when transactions can be classified by trader identity. Similar to Locke and Venkatesh (1997) , Ferguson and Mann (2001) , Locke and Sarajoyi (2004) , and Kurov, (2005) , we use accounting FIFO estimates to estimate trading costs, but with a much more refined data set 1 .
In this study, we calculate three cost/profit estimates on each day. First, we use the accounting FIFO rule to determine trading profits per contract (PROFIT TRADE) and obtain the inventory positions for each of the six (trader) account types on the SXF. Second, the profit settled per contract (PROFIT SETTLED) for the inventory positions of each account type is determined by assuming that the inventories in each aggregated account are settled at the closing price of each contract. Finally, we estimate average profits per contract for each type of account as the weighted average FIFO profits and settled profits of inventories with weights given by the number of contracts traded or settled.
To illustrate the FIFO rule, suppose that there are only four transactions during a day from investors in a Client account. At time t1, investors in the Client account buy 50 contracts of SXFH with a price of 500.0; at time t2, investors in the Client account sell 20 contracts of SXFH with a price of 500.2; at time t3, investors in the Client account buy 30 contracts of SXFH with price equal to 500.3; at time t4, investors in the Client account sell 58 contracts of SXFH at the price of 500.5. Suppose also that the average last bid and ask for SXFH at the end of the day is 500.8.
First, we use the accounting rule of FIFO to get profit trade per contract (the value of 0.10 index point change is C$20 per contract): C$20 *(20*(500.2-500.0) +30*(500.5-500.0) +28*(500.5-500.3))/78= C$6.3077 per contract; the inventory position in the Client account on SXFH is long 2 contracts at the end of that day.
Second, the profit settled per contract for the inventory position is: C$20 *2*(500.8-500.3)/2 =C$10.0000 per contract.
Finally, average profits per contract for the Client account on that day are: (C$6.3077*78+ C$10.000*2)/80=C$6.4000 per contract. Average profit is the weight average profits of the FIFO profit and the profits of daily inventory imbalance settled at the closing price. The number of contracts traded or settled is used as the weight. C is constant term in the OLS model. The best bid price is defined as the highest price a prospective buyer is prepared to pay at a particular time for trading the futures contract. In the analyses, Best 1 Bid is defined as the best bid depth, which corresponds to the sum of all bid sizes (number of contracts) that are submitted as limit orders for trading at the best bid price for market participant bid quotations that are equal to the best bid price. The best ask (or offer) price is the lowest price at which someone who owns the contract offers to sell it. Best 1 Ask is the best ask depth, which is the sum of all ask sizes (number of contracts) that are submitted as limit orders to trade at the best ask price for market participant ask quotations that are equal to the best ask price. Value in Bold indicates significant at 5 percent level. Data for 356 trading days are used in the regression.
Since a buy /sell in an aggregated account could be closed but then immediately followed a sell/buy, our FIFO cost estimate is largely immune to any informational effects. As an extreme example, suppose an investor in the Client account buys 30 contracts of SXFH; then suppose that immediately after a millisecond, another investor in Client account sells 30 contracts of SXFH. The position in the Client account is closed in a millisecond. The calculated FIFO costs in this case will reflect only liquidity costs.
In this work, we first sort the records by the date and hour, and then by milliseconds to get the FIFO transaction series for a daily session. The last average of bid and ask price is used as the closing price on the trading day 2 .
Many previous studies suggest that trading activity increases market liquidity. However, accurate measures of trading activity, such as trading volume per transaction are not available, and as a result, activity levels are usually measured by the number of transactions (McInish and Wood, 1992) . In contrast, our data include the trading volume per transaction for each account type and the actual price executed, which we can use as the independent variables as specified in our model of the determinants of trading costs.
In particular, to further investigate the relationship between the transaction costs and trading activity, we estimate the following regression model:
where Costs is our measures of transaction costs; C is constant term; Q is the daily mean quantity of Best 1 Ask or Bid; TV is mean trade volume per transaction on each day; P is transaction price; and D is a dummy variable, which equals 1 when TV +3 * StdTV > Q + 3 *StdQ. Std stands for standard deviation for the above measures.
OLS estimation results on both the Bid and Ask sides for three aggregated account types of Client, Pro, Firm and transaction by Hedger, Speculator and Market Maker are presented in Table 3 .1. The results are similar whether we use the measures of Bid side or the measures of Ask side. Overall, the regression results show virtually no relationship between transaction costs and measures of market activity for the SXF. Most coefficients of market activity measures are insignificant at 5 percent level.
Limit Order Quotes and Trading of the SXF
Why are transactions costs unrelated to measures of trading activity? In this section, we explore the role of limit orders. In Table 3 .2 we provide summary statistics on limit order quotes and limit order size. For each trading day, we cumulate the records of each limit order quote and limit order quantity that is submitted over the day. Table 3 .2 reports the cumulative averages across all trading days in the sample. As is shown in the table, the Best 1 and 2 variables, which capture the number of contracts submitted as limited orders at best and second best prices for market participants are similar on the bid and ask sides (Panel A vs. Panel B).
In addition, the average of daily standard deviation of limit order quantity (Average Std Q), the average of maximum quantity of limit order in each trading day (Average max Q) or the mean of daily standard deviation of the average size of limit order per order (Std Average Size) are similar on the bid and the ask side. Table 3 .2 Summary statistics for SXF limit orders. Notes: Summary statistics for limit order quotes for the SXF are shown. Daily statistics are used to calculate the averages. Average mean Q is the average of daily mean quantity of limit orders. Average Std Q is the average daily standard deviation of limit order quantities. Average max Q is the average of the maximum quantity of limit orders in each trading day. Mean Average Size is the mean of the daily average size of limit order per order. Std Average Size is the mean of daily standard deviation of the average size of limit order per order. The best bid price is defined as the highest price a prospective buyer is prepared to pay at a particular time for trading the futures contract. In the analyses, the variable Best 1 Bid is defined as the best bid depth, which corresponds to the sum of all bid sizes (number of contracts) that are submitted as limit orders for trading at the best bid price for market participant bid quotations that are equal to the best bid price. Best 2 Bid is the second best bid depth, and so forth. The best ask (or offer) price is the lowest price at which someone who owns the contract offers to sell it. We define Best 1 Ask as the best ask depth, which is the sum of all ask sizes (number of contracts) that are submitted as limit orders to trade at the best ask price for market participant ask quotations that are equal to the best ask price. Best2 ask is the second best ask depth. Best 1and 2 combine the records of the Best 1 limit order and the Best 2 limit order. The sample consists of 356 days from January 04, 2005 to May 30, 2006. Statistics of two sub-periods from Jan. 05 to May 05 and from Jan. 06 to May 06 are also presented.
Summary statistics for transactions cumulated on a daily basis are provided in Table 3 .3. As shown in the panel A of the table, for the entire market (All account), the average of daily mean of the number of the nearby SXF contract traded per transaction (Mean Trade Volume) is 2.49 contracts and the average maximum number of the nearby SXF contract traded per transaction on each trading day (Max Trade Volume) is 262.92 contracts.
The Client category has a higher value in the average of the daily number of the nearby SXF contract traded (Number Trading) than the Firm, Pro, Hedger, Speculator or Market Maker categories. It is therefore quite obvious that Market Makers/Pros do not precipitate all Client transactions. Moreover, the Pro/Market Maker category exhibits the lowest values in Mean Trade Volume, Max Trade Volume and Std Trade Volume (the average of the standard deviation of the number of nearby SXF contract traded per transaction on each day) across the six account types. These results suggest that Pros/Market Makers do not adjust their inventory level by incurring additional costs with a few large orders.
We also present the average of weighted price of the SXF transaction in our sample period with the weights determined by the number of contracts traded (Ave Weight Price), the average of daily mean transaction price (Mean Price), the average of the daily standard deviation of transaction price (Std Price), the average of the minimum transaction price on each day (Min Price) and the average of the maximum transaction price on each day (Max Price), respectively, in Table 3 .3. Overall, the market of the SXF is not particularly volatile in our sample period: The average standard deviation of transaction price (Std Price) is only about 1.5; and the differences between Min Price and Mean Price or the differences between Max Price and Mean Price are small. Goettler et al. (2005) assert that the midpoint of the bid-ask spread is not a good proxy for the asset's true value. Instead, the transaction price is closer to the true value of the asset. Table  3 .3 shows that Ave Weight Price is close to Mean Price; therefore, there is no evidence that the aggregated participants in any account category has persistent informational advantage over others. This result is consistent with Gilbert and Rijken (2006) , who show that asymmetric information is less important in index futures markets.
Most important is that the Mean Trade Volume in Table 3 .3 is much less than the Average mean Q in Table 3 Notes: This table compares the daily mean plus 3 standard derivation of trading volume per transaction with daily Mean, daily Mean plus 1 standard derivation and daily Mean plus 3 standard derivation of limit order per record on both the Bid and Ask sides. The Best 1 limit order combines the Best 1 Bid and Best Ask 1 variables. The best bid price is defined as the highest price a prospective buyer is prepared to pay at a particular time for trading the futures contract. In the analyses, the variable Best 1 Bid is defined as the best bid depth, which corresponds to the sum of all bid sizes (number of contracts) that are submitted as limit orders for trading at the best bid price for market participant bid quotations that are equal to the best bid price. The best ask (or offer) price is the lowest price at which someone who owns the contract offers to sell it. We define Best1 Ask as the best ask depth, which is the sum of all ask sizes (number of contracts) that are submitted as limit orders to trade at the best ask price for market participant ask quotations that are equal to the best ask price. Column Number days are the number of days that Mean plus 3 sd of Trading volume is less than or equal to the Mean quote, Mean plus 1 sd of quote or Mean plus 3 sd of quote of limit order. Percent of sample day is based on actual trading day. Notes: This table compares the daily mean plus 3 standard derivation of trading volume per transaction with daily Mean, daily Mean plus 1 standard derivation and daily Mean plus 3 standard derivation of bid and ask limit orders per record. The Best 1 limit order combines the Best 1 Bid and Best Ask 1 variables. The best bid price is defined as the highest price a prospective buyer is prepared to pay at a particular time for trading the futures contract. In the analyses, the variable Best 1 Bid is defined as the best bid depth, which corresponds to the sum of all bid sizes (number of contracts) that are submitted as limit orders for trading at the best bid price for market participant bid quotations that are equal to the best bid price. The best ask (or offer) price is the lowest price at which someone who owns the contract offers to sell it. We define Best 1 Ask as the best ask depth, which is the sum of all ask sizes (number of contracts) that are submitted as limit orders to trade at the best ask price for market participant ask quotations that are equal to the best ask price. Column Number days are the number of days that Mean plus 3 sd of Trading volume is less than or equal to Mean quote, Mean plus 1 sd of quote or Mean plus 3 sd of quote of limit order. Percent of sample day is based on actual trading days. The sample consists of 356 days from January 04, 2005 to May 30, 2006. Statistics of two sub-periods from Jan. 05 to May 05 and from Jan. 06 to May 06 are also presented.
The liquidity providing role of the Best 1 limit order is more obvious for Pros and Market Makers. The Mean Trade Volume plus three times the Std Trade Volume for the Pro category is 5.81 (1.76+3*1.35) contracts per transaction, which about half of the 10.95 contracts of the Average mean Q on the Best 1 quote. The Best 1 quote provides enough liquidity for market makers.
In addition, the values of Max Trade Volume for the whole sample period (Panel A of Table  3 .3) are all less than 294.18 of the Average max Q for Best 1.This fact also implies that participants in the SXF must reference their trades to the best 1 limit order. In other words, investors with large positions or investors who want to build a large position have to strategically split large orders to close/build their position, according to the depth of the best 1 limit order, to ameliorate price impact and information leakage effects. Comparisons of daily mean plus 3 standard derivation of trading volume per transaction with daily Mean, daily Mean plus 1 standard derivation and daily Mean plus 3 standard derivation of limit order per record on both Bid and Ask side are shown. The Best 1 limit order combines the Best 1 Bid and Best Ask 1 variables. The best bid price is defined as the highest price a prospective buyer is prepared to pay at a particular time for trading the futures contract. In the analyses, the variable Best 1 Bid is defined as the best bid depth, which corresponds to the sum of all bid sizes (number of contracts) that are submitted as limit orders for trading at the best bid price for market participant bid quotations that are equal to the best bid price. The best ask (or offer) price is the lowest price at which someone who owns the contract offers to sell it. Best 1 Ask is the best ask depth, which is the sum of all ask sizes (number of contracts) that are submitted as limit orders to trade at the best ask price for market participant ask quotations that are equal to the best ask price. Column Number days are the number of days that Mean plus 3 sd of Trading volume is less than or equal to Mean quote, Mean plus 1 sd of quote or Mean plus 3 sd of quote of limit order. Percent of sample day is based on actual trading days. The sample consists of 356 days from January 04, 2005 to May 30, 2006. Statistics of two sub-periods from Jan. 05 to May 05 and from Jan. 06 to May 06 are also presented.
The role of limit orders, especially the best 1 limit order, in providing enough liquidity and determining participants' trading behaviour is also illustrated in Table 3 .4, which examines the relationship between trading volume and the best 1 limit order on each trading day of our 356 sample days. We find that, in more than 80 percent of the 356 trading days in the sample, the daily mean plus 3 standard deviation of trading volume per transaction (Mean plus 3 sd of Trading volume ) is less than the daily mean plus one standard deviation of best1 limit order (Mean plus 1 sd of quote) per record; and, in more than 90 percent of trading days, the daily mean plus 3 standard deviation of trading volume are less than the daily mean plus 3 standard deviation of best1 limit order (Mean plus 3 sd of quote). Sophisticated investors in this market (Pro and Market Maker) seem more likely to conduct their transactions at the best 1 limit order quote. Table 3 .5 presents additional evidence that the best 1 limit order for the SXF is a key determinant of the market liquidity. In 356 trading days, almost every day shows mean trading volume per transaction (Mean Trade Volume) less than the daily mean of the best 1 limit order per record on both Bid and Ask side for every aggregated accounts or the market as a whole (All). Notes: Comparisons of daily mean trading volume per transaction with daily mean of the Best 1 limit order per record on both Bid and Ask side are shown. The Best 1 limit order combines the Best 1 Bid and Best Ask 1 variables. The best bid price is defined as the highest price a prospective buyer is prepared to pay at a particular time for trading the futures contract. In the analyses, the variable Best 1 Bid is defined as the best bid depth, which corresponds to the sum of all bid sizes (number of contracts) that are submitted as limit orders for trading at the best bid price for market participant bid quotations that are equal to the best bid price. The best ask (or offer) price is the lowest price at which someone who owns the contract offers to sell it. Best 1 Ask is the best ask depth, which is the sum of all ask sizes (number of contracts) that are submitted as limit orders to trade at the best ask price for market participant ask quotations that are equal to the best ask price. Number days are the number of days that mean trading volume is less than or equal to the mean quote of the limit order. Percent of sample day is based on actual trading days.
To recap, it is quite evident that the best 1 limit order provides is a central determinant of the liquidity of the market. As shown above, most transactions have the order size that is much smaller that the sizes of the Best 1 limit order. To further highlight this issue, in Table 3 .6, we show that there is a significantly positive correlation between daily mean trading volume per transaction (Mean Trade Volume) and mean Best 1 limit order on either bid side (Mean BIDQ) or ask side (Mean ASKQ). Ahn et al. (2001) show that transitory volatility arises mainly from the paucity of limit orders at the best queue. Our finding in Table 3 .6 of a significantly negative correlation between best 1 quotes (Mean BIDQ and Mean ASKQ) and the volatility of transaction prices (Std Price) consistent with Ahn et al. (2001) 3 .
Mean BIDQ In the analyses, the variable Best 1 Bid is defined as the best bid depth, which corresponds to the sum of all bid sizes (number of contracts) that are submitted as limit orders for trading at the best bid price for market participant bid quotations that are equal to the best bid price. The best ask (or offer) price is the lowest price at which someone who owns the contract offers to sell it. Best 1 Ask is the best ask depth, which is the sum of all ask sizes (number of contracts) that are submitted as limit orders to trade at the best ask price for market participant ask quotations that are equal to the best ask price. Std Price is the daily standard deviation of transaction prices; Std Trade Volume is the standard deviation of the number of the SXF contract traded per transaction on each day. 356 daily data are used in the test. Absolute Pearson correlations are significant for critical values in excess of .1046 (.1368) at the 5% (1%) level of significance. Foucault et al. (2005) argue that, in equilibrium, patient traders tend to submit limit orders, whereas impatient traders submit market orders. Markets with a high proportion of patient traders (as is the case here) or a small order arrival rate are more resilient. Table 3 .6 also shows that the pair-wise correlations among Std BIDQ, Std ASKQ, Std Trade Volume and Std Price are close to zero. These results are consistent with our conclusion that the best 1 limit orders are the central drivers of the SXF market. The majority of participants in the SXF market either make their trading decisions with respect to the best 1 limit order quote on the screen or adjust their trading behaviour in accordance with this quote. This is also consistent with Locke and Sarkar (2001) and Bortoli et al. (2006) 4 .
In sum, our inability to find any significant relationship between (carefully measured), transaction costs with measures of trading activities is consistent with the market operating during a period of normal volatility, with the limit order book (Best 1 quotes) supplying adequate liquidity, where buy and sell orders are consummated at the Best 1 quotes.
In Table 3 .7, we test the different measures of the best 1 order and trading of the SXF market for unit roots market by using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test with four lags for the 356 daily data.
As shown in the Figure 3 .2 illustrate the mean reverting behaviour of the measures of market activities in our sample period; in addition, Figure 3 .1 also demonstrates that the size of trading per transaction is much less than the sizes of the Best 1 limit orders.
Cost, Spreads, and Minimum Tick Sizes
To provide further evidence that SXF market is in equilibrium and the inappropriateness of spreads in an equilibrium limit order market, we also calculate the spreads. The best bid price is defined as the highest price a prospective buyer is prepared to pay at a particular time for trading the futures contract. In the analyses, the variable Best 1 Bid is defined as the best bid depth, which corresponds to the sum of all bid sizes (number of contracts) that are submitted as limit orders for trading at the best bid price for market participant bid quotations that are equal to the best bid price. The best ask (or offer) price is the lowest price at which someone who owns the contract offers to sell it. Best1 Ask is the best ask depth, which is the sum of all ask sizes (number of contracts) that are submitted as limit orders to trade at the best ask price for market participant ask quotations that are equal to the best ask price. Table 3 .8 Statistics of the SXF Spreads. Notes: Average daily mean and standard deviation of the SXF spreads is present in the table. The best bid price is defined as the highest price a prospective buyer is prepared to pay at a particular time for trading the futures contract. In the analyses, the variable Best 1 Bid is defined as the best bid depth, which corresponds to the sum of all bid sizes (number of contracts) that are submitted as limit orders for trading at the best bid price for market participant bid quotations that are equal to the best bid price. Best 2 Bid is the second best bid depth, and so forth. The best ask (or offer) price is the lowest price at which someone who owns the contract offers to sell it. The SXF minimum tick is 0.05; Spread1 =Ask Price -Bid Price; Spread2= (Ask Price-Bid Price)*2/ (Ask Price + Bid Price)*100. Table 3 .8 shows that the average of daily mean spreads and daily standards deviation of spreads for SXF in our sample period. In the table, the Best 1 limit order combines the Best 1 Bid and Best Ask 1 variables. The best bid price is defined as the highest price a prospective buyer is prepared to pay at a particular time for trading the futures contract. In the analyses, the variable Best 1 Bid is defined as the best bid depth, which corresponds to the sum of all bid sizes (number of contracts) that are submitted as limit orders for trading at the best bid price for market participant bid quotations that are equal to the best bid price. The best ask (or offer) price is the lowest price at which someone who owns the contract offers to sell it. Best 1 Ask is the best ask depth, which is the sum of all ask sizes (number of contracts) that are submitted as limit orders to trade at the best ask price for market participant ask quotations that are equal to the best ask price. We calculate two measures for bid-ask spreads.
Spread1 =Ask Price -Bid Price (3.2) Spread2= (Ask Price-Bid Price)*2/(Ask Price + Bid Price)*100 (3.3) Table 3 .9 shows the mean daily FIFO cost results on the front SXF contract.
From Table 3 .8, we note that the averages of daily mean spread (Spread 1) are much higher than the SXF minimum tick of 0.05. Table 3 .9 shows that the costs are much higher than the value of the SXF minimum tick (C$ 10).
Several empirical papers have examined the impact of tick size changes on market quality. For example, Bacidore (1997) , Ahn et al. (1998) and Griffiths et al. (1998) study reduction of tick size on the TSE in 1996. Goldstein and Kavajecz (2000) and Chordia et al. (2001) show that the inside spread significantly decreased, but depth at the best bid and ask also decreased after the reduction in tick size of the NYSE. Kurov and Zabotina (2005) find that the minimum tick sizes of the E-mini S&P 500 and E-mini Nasdaq-100 futures contracts preventing the spreads from decreasing to the levels implied by a competitive market. In addition, Bortoli et al. (2006) report that trading at the minimum tick in the Sydney Futures Exchange embraces 87.8% of observations for the SPI, 95.2% for bank-accepted bills, 97.8% for three-year bonds, and 94.4% for ten-year bonds in the periods before or after the Sydney Futures Exchange changed the limit order disclosure rule.
In the SXF market, however, the spread and costs are much higher than the minimum tick size. Hence, it is clear the established spread/ minimum tick size may not be reflective of the market at any particular point in time 6 .
In addition, from Table 3 .3), it is evident that trading costs are not well captured by spreads for the SXF market.
In the work, we also perform regression analysis on the costs and spreads with the model of Equation 1, substituting the quantity of limit orders (Q) in the model with Spreads. These results are shown in Table 3 .10. The lack of significance of the explanatory variables holds whether Spread1 or Spread2 is used in the regression; consistent with Locke and Venkatesh (1997) , daily mean spreads (BA) and standard deviation of daily spreads (std BA) show no relationship with transaction costs.
Overall, the results show that traditional spreads have no relationship with the trading costs in the SXF market and that the minimum tick size do not act as binding constraints on the bidask spreads and costs.
In fact, spreads as the measures of transaction costs need very strong assumption that all transactions are go through market makers. Since Client in our sample has much more transactions than Pro/Market maker, such an assumption clear does not held in SXF market. However, our FIFO cost is extensively used in accounting book keeping and is direct measure costs. The finding that no relationship between FIFO costs and spreads further supports that traditional spreads are inappropriate as the measure of trading costs, especially in a full electronic market. The best bid price is defined as the highest price a prospective buyer is prepared to pay at a particular time for trading the futures contract. In the analyses, the variable Best 1 Bid is defined as the best bid depth, which corresponds to the sum of all bid sizes (number of contracts) that are submitted as limit orders for trading at the best bid price for market participant bid quotations that are equal to the best bid price. Best 2 Bid is the second best bid depth, and so forth. The best ask (or offer) price is the lowest price at which someone who owns the contract offers to sell it. Best 1 Ask is the best ask depth, which is the sum of all ask sizes (number of contracts) that are submitted as limit orders to trade at the best ask price for market participant ask quotations that are equal to the best ask price. Best 2 Ask is the second best ask depth; Spread1 =Ask Price -Bid Price; and Spread2= (Ask Price-Bid Price)*2/ (Ask Price + Bid Price)*100. 
Analyses of Transactions by Order Type
In the work, we also differentiate SXF transaction across order types with another trade data file that recodes each trade with Limit, Market The best bid price is defined as the highest price a prospective buyer is prepared to pay at a particular time for trading the futures contract. In the analyses, the variable Best 1 Bid is defined as the best bid depth, which corresponds to the sum of all bid sizes (number of contracts) that are submitted as limit orders for trading at the best bid price for market participant bid quotations that are equal to the best bid price. Best 2 Bid is the second best bid depth, and so forth. The best ask (or offer) price is the lowest price at which someone who owns the contract offers to sell it. We define Best1 Ask as the best ask depth, which is the sum of all ask sizes (number of contracts) that are submitted as limit orders to trade at the best ask price for market participant ask quotations that are equal to the best ask price. Best 2 Ask is the second best ask depth. Spread1 =Ask Price -Bid Price; and Spread2= (Ask Price-Bid Price)*2/ (Ask Price + Bid Price)*100. Harris and Hasbrouck (1996) document that 54 percent of SuperDot orders are limit orders. Ross et al. (1996) report that limit orders account for 65 percent (75 percent) of all executed orders (executed shares) in SuperDot. Compared with these results, limit orders are used much more extensively in SXF trades. As shown in the In such a market where limit orders are used by most transactions, the role of limit order book must be more important. When the best 1 quote book in the market provides enough liquidity/buffer to absorb potential trading orders, transaction costs should not be expected to be related to with measures of trading activities. On the other hand, to ameliorate price impact and informational leakage effects, investors looking to open or close large positions may need to structure their orders according to the depth of the best 1 limit order, to ameliorate price impact and information leakage effects.
CONCLUSION
Using a unique database that includes the quotes and trade characteristics of the SXF market from January 2005 to May 2006 on the index futures of the SXF with aggregated trader types identified and time stamped in millisecond from the Montreal Exchange, We find that transactions costs, as correctly measured are not related to measures of trading activity, in both pair-wise correlation analyses as well as in a regression framework when limit orders provide enough liquidity for markets, especially for electronic systems.
The limit order book conveys information about the market. Statistics of transaction by order type show that almost all trades are executed by limit orders for SXF market.
We find a significant role for limit orders, especially that of depth 1 in determining participants' trading behaviour, and in providing liquidity to the market. In addition, the results highlight the inability of traditional spreads to measure trading costs.
All our level or volatility measures of quotes and trades by every aggregated account show evidence of mean reversion. This is consistent with a dynamic equilibrium process for the SXF market, wherein shocks to the variables do not have permanent dislocating effects. Moreover, the fact that the costs or spreads are much higher than the minimum tick size also implies participants in the SXF market respect the limit order to make their investment decision.
Although participants in a limit order market can employ different order placement strategies, the aggregated actions of the participants still can leads the market to dynamic equilibrium when a majority of the participants have, on aggregated basis, established trading proclivities. In such an equilibrium system, the aggregated trading costs will not follow the fluctuations of various traditional market activity measures. Studying the overall equilibrium of electronic systems for other derivative markets and the role of limit order book in determining the participants' trading behaviour remains a topic for future work.
